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In this paper, we offer a microfoundational perspective to challenge the consensual view of ambidextrous 
search as a superior approach to addressing performance problems. W characterize the nature of search 
as both ostensive and agentic, and suggest that search performance is idiosyncratic across individuals and 
highly dependent on decision makers’ cognitive frameworks and social contexts. To test our theory, we 
develop a mathematical simulation model that formalizes the mechanisms regulating the search behaviors of 
senior leaders in both family and non-family firms, thus highlighting the relevance of socio-cognitive 
factors. Our results suggest that a search approach that is conducive to superior performance in non-
family firms may yield inferior performance in family firms depending on the senior leader’s family 
membership and her/his positional history in the firm (i.e., non-family, founder, later-generation). 
Moreover, we reveal that while ambidexterity constitutes a superior search appoach for family firms with 
founder CEOs, those with non-family or later-generation CEOs would seem to benefit from 
specialization.  




Understanding how organizations search for solutions t  problems signaled by negative performance 
feedback—i.e., how they identify, examine, and evaluate any knowledge and information that can 
potentially help close a performance gap—has been on the agenda of organizational researchers since the 
very first formulation of the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963). However, it was James 
March’s (1991) pioneering article that introduced the first conceptual characterization of search. At the heart 
of March’s (1991) article is the trade-off between two fundamental search approaches, namely, exploitation 
and exploration, and the contention that “maintaining an appropriate balance between exploration and 
exploitation is a primary factor in system survival and prosperity” (1991, p. 71). Subsequent empirical 
research provides extensive evidence that, on average, successful organizations are ambidextrous – capable 
of pursuing “exploration and exploitation synchronously via loosely coupled and differentiated subunits or 
individuals, each of which specializes in either exploration or exploitation” (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; 




Raisch et al., 2009). Our concern is with the generalizability of this claim. Indeed, our understanding is still 
limited of why organizations that operate under similar circumstances and adopt similar search approaches 
experience heterogeneous performance outcomes (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). 
These limited insights may be due to prior studies defining organizational heterogeneity according to 
the particular search approach adopted (the “how”), rather than the organizational actors who are directly 
involved in, and have the power to influence, strategic decisions (Criscuolo et al., 2018). In particular, 
although the role of individuals i central to March’s original model, research has tended to underestimate 
the “who” in the search process (Banerjee et al., 2018; Li  et al., 2013), rarely applying microfoundational 
approaches to understand how organizations can balance exploitation and exploration, and the consequences 
thereof (e.g., Abell et al., 2008; Eisenhardt et al., 2010; Felin et al., 2012; Foss, 2011). The burgeoning 
interest in microfoundations for organization and strategy endorses the relevance of individual-level 
considerations to explain macro-level phenomena (Felin et al., 2015). As Selznick (1996) argued, “no social 
process can be understood save as it is located in the behavior of individuals” (p. 274). Likewise, at the 
macro-level, organizations adopting similar search approaches might obtain divergent performance 
outcomes due to the heterogeneity of organizational actors’ reactions to performance feedback and the 
underlying socio-cognitive factors (Banerjee et al., 2018). 
The critical role that these socio-cognitive factors play has been emphasized in the family business 
setting, where prior research has revealed that family involvement in the firm entails unique cognitive 
frameworks that affect how family owners and managers interpret and react to performance feedback 
(Nason et al., 2018), thereby influencing their search strategies (Brinkeri k, 2018). For example, Chrisman 
and Patel (2012) and Patel and Chrisman (2014) show that family firm decision makers increase (decrease) 
search intensity to a greater extent than their counterparts in non-family firms when facing negative 
(positive) performance feedback. De Massis et al. (2016) recently suggested that family firm decision 
makers manifest a strong tendency to integrate past knowledge into their search efforts. Although reliance 
on the past can induce rigidity and stall adaptation, the longevity of multi-generation family firms may result 




these studies point to the possibility that search may unfold differently over time, not only across family and 
non-family firms, but also among family firms. Drawing on these insights provides us with an opportunity 
to extend the search literature and offer a more fine-grained view of the microfoundational processes 
underpinning ambidextrous and other search approaches. 
We explore these ideas through a simulation model that extends Levinthal and March’s (1981) classic 
model of adaptive search—the first to characterize search as local and distant—by integrating assumptions 
from recent theory and empirical evidence from the family business literature. Computer simulation is 
particularly appropriate to investigate the macro-level outcomes of micro-level processes and mechanisms, 
allowing circumventing the empirical problem of data availability (Harrison et al., 2007; Pentland et al.,
2012). Similarly to Levinthal and March (1981), we model sarch as an iterative and highly routinized 
sequence of activities that range from envisioning a set of viable alternatives, randomly selecting a course of 
action (blind selection), evaluating it (on-line evaluation), and obtaining feedback for adjustments. However, 
by adopting a microfoundational lens, we include distinctive micro-level factors that affect the search 
process. Indeed, we find that search outcomes are idiosyncratic across firms and their senior leaders, 
inducing us to question some commonly-held beliefs in the search literature. For instance, our simulation 
results indicate that while ambidexterity constitutes a superior search approach for family firms with founder 
CEOs, those with non-family or later-generation CEOs would seem to benefit from specialization. 
Our paper makes two important contributions. First, it extends the scope of traditional approaches to 
the study of search by unveiling some micro-level mechanisms that may help explain the heterogeneity in 
the outcomes of distinct search approaches. By embracing a microfoundational perspective, it sets the stage 
for a more sophisticated assessment of why heterogeneity occurs in organizational responses to negative 
performance feedback, which accounts for the substantial latitude that, even in routinized settings, is 
afforded to senior leaders in their actions. Second, ur findings offer important contributions to family 
business theory and practice, highlighting the search pproaches that potentially facilitate or hamper family 
firm performance, and responding to recent calls to ad pt a microfoundational lens to build more 




We proceed in four steps. First, we characterize the nature of search as both ostensive and agentic. 
While the ostensive element relates to the automatic and routinized nature of search, the agentic element 
refers to the actual performance of search activities that decision makers conduct based on their 
understanding and interpretation of the present situation (Feldman and Pentland, 2003). Second, we discuss 
the ostensive and agentic elements in relation to family firms. Third, we present our search model and its 
underlying assumptions. Finally, we illustrate and i terpret the results, exploring the implications of our 
theory for research on search, learning, performance, and family business. 
Search as both ostensive and agentic 
The ostensive nature of search 
The original conceptualization of search offered by Cyert and March (1963) assumes the existence of a 
“high degree of automaticity in firms’ response to performance feedback and an overly routinized process of 
search” (Posen et al., 2018, p. 231). Performance feedback is defined as “a diagnostic tool that managers use 
to discover problems in the organization and initiate search and decision-making activities” (Greve, 2003b, 
p. 7), enabling decision makers to almost instantaneously move from the recognition of a performance 
shortfall to the search for a solution (Posen et al., 2018). For instance, “managers may find it relatively 
straightforward to identify the problems associated with a decline in the innovation performance relative o 
the aspiration and, in an attempt to resolve the performance discrepancy, may search for new modes (e.g.,
CVC units) to conduct R&D” (Gaba and Bhattacharya, 2012, p. 181). Put differently, the ostensive nature of 
search manifests in a number of standard operating procedures or performance programs that enable 
decision makers to move from performance feedback to a repertoire of possibilities (Feldman and Pentland, 
2003; March and Simon, 1958). 
In its traditional conceptualization, search is situated: decision makers are likely to initiate search in the 
neighborhood of a problem symptom, allocating resources to the functional unit deemed responsible for the 
problem and/or having access to specific information and knowledge (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; 




is found that satisfies some minimum performance criteria (Caplin et al., 2011; Cyert and March, 1963; 
Simon, 1955). The evaluation of alternatives is conducted on-line: the selected alternative needs to be 
implemented to assess its performance implications, whereby superior trials are no more likely to be 
implemented than inferior ones (Levinthal and Posen, 2007; Levitt and March, 1988). Finally, because 
bounded rationality leads decision makers to rely on path-dependent search routines, earch is guided by the 
memory of past choices (Cyert and March, 1963; Greve, 2003b). This highly mechanistic view of search is 
purposely devoid of a substantial cognitive component, which results in severely limiting the role played by 
human agency (Posen et al., 2018). However, there is theoretical research that points to a variety of 
mechanisms demanding higher-level cognitive abilities to make decision makers aware of, and enable 
identifying, specific alternatives (Gavetti, 2012; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). There is good reason to 
believe that the search process inherently incorporates the subjective understandings and viewpoints of the 
individuals involved (Banerjee et al., 2018; cf. Feldman and Pentland, 2003). 
 
The agentic nature of search 
Even if highly routinized and regulated by specific rules and procedures, search in respo se to 
performance feedback “requires actors to recognize specific situations and choose appropriate behaviors 
from an almost infinite repertoire” (cf. Smets and Jarzabkowski, 2013, p. 1281)—a capability that is far 
from mindless. Individual agency can thus play an important role in the search process (Banerjee et al., 
2018; Li et al., 2013; Posen et al., 2018), involving “the individual ability to remember the past, imagine the 
future, and respond to present circumstances” (Feldman and Pentland, 2003, p.  95). 
Cardinale (2018) recently distinguished between two dimensions of agency: reflective and pre-
reflective. While the reflective dimension is associated with means-end reasoning, the pre-reflective 
dimension involves a “creative (improvisational) mobilization of skills, developed through past 
experience, to tackle unfolding situations” (Cardinale, 2018, p. 133). In the context of search, the two 
dimensions are highly intertwined: the reflective dimension leads an actor to p sit means and ends, direct 




dimension acts instead on individual propensities toward searching in the proximity of some courses of 
action—rather than others—because they present themselves as self-evident, without any alternative 
being explicitly articulated and purposely chosen. “It reflects a generative process through which actors 
tackle the present by activating the flexible schemes acquired during the past. More specifically, the 
mechanism lies in the extraction of pertinent schemes from the habitus and their application to novel 
situations” (Cardinale, 2018, p. 136). Accordingly, the agentic nature of search can be best understood as 
inherently embedded and situated in the specific context in which an actor currently operates and has 
operated in the past. Means and ends are not only influenced by the actors’ individual beliefs and 
viewpoints, but also by how such viewpoints aggregate at the organizational-level in collective cognitive 
frameworks, achieving an established and value-impregnated status (Selznick, 1949, p. 256). In general, 
embeddedness in a particular social context is likely to affect the ways in which actors posit means and 
ends, and therefore the ways in which they adapt their search behaviors in response to performance 
feedback (Maggitti et al., 2013). In parallel, cognitive frameworks shape the “preconscious understanding 
that organizational actors share” (DiMaggio, 1988, p. 3), thus influencing their pre-reflective orientation 
toward specific alternatives. As a consequence, it is reasonable to expect that the mechanisms underlying 
search and its outcomes will differ as a function of the actors’ cognitive frameworks and the social 
contexts in which they operate. 
Yet, the search literature falls short f capturing the role played by human agency in the search process 
and examining its socio-cognitive underpinnings (Banerjee et al., 2018; Li et al., 2013). It remains unclear 
whether and to what extent search outcomes are influenced by micro-level cognitive mechanisms or whether 
they are purely based on the search approach adopted and the background rules regulating it. In the 
following section, we describe how the family social context and senior leaders’ current and positional 
history in such context may affect the agentic element of search.  
 




“Although comparable industry conditions and firm resources could lead to similar cognitive 
frameworks among non-family managers, additional socio-cognitive factors that accompany the pursuit of 
family goals appear to lead to divergent and more complex cognitive frameworks among owners and 
managers in family firms” (Chrisman and Patel, 2012, p. 993). Family business research indicates that 
“families develop idiosyncratic cognitive frameworks based on socio-cognitive bonds engendered through 
social interactions, communication, shared experience, and the recalling of family stories and traditions” 
(Nason et al., 2018). Regardless of the legal and biological ties that connect decision makers within family 
firms, the shared history and shared future among family firm workers generate a sense of connection and 
group identity that opens up the boundaries of the amily to different actors (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
The pre-reflective element of search in family firms 
By recalling and commemorating past events through family stories and narratives, the interrelations 
among family members produce the content of memory, foster collective consciousness, and shape the 
configuration of a more general collective cognitive framework that directs the attention of decision makers 
toward certain memories in the present, and thus influe ces how search is performed (De Massis et al., 
2016). This is likely to occur at a pre-reflective level (see Table 1). The social context of family firms and 
the socio-material representations related to family history predispose actors toward some courses of action 
that appear to be endowed with a sense of inevitability (cf. Cardinale, 2018, p. 141). For example, De
Massis et al. (2016) highlight how decision makers in family firms have a unique propensity to identify 
solutions and generate new knowledge by retrieving and rei terpreting the past to fit the present and shape 
the construction of the future. On the one hand, reliance on internal knowledge and family tradition may 
prevent family firm decision makers from using external knowledge sources. On the other hand, the long 
temporal span of socio-material representations related to family histories increases search richness, 
enabling family firm decision makers to retrieve and recombine temporally distant knowledge components 
(Petruzzelli and Savino, 2014). Furthermore, the importance of past and historical occurrences protects 




most proximate prior searches (Baum et al., 2000; Levitt and March, 1988)—and enables them to retrieve 
valuable solutions whose time has not yet come (Capaldo et al., 2017; Nerkar, 2003). 
However, this pre-reflective activation and transposition of schemes and solutions from the past to 
tackle the present also depends on the positional history of actors in the social context of the family 
business. “The history of positioning generates the experience that actors systematize by developing 
dispositions attuned to acting appropriately in those positions. Experience is, to some extent, specific to 
each individual because of the different positions occupied. Therefore, depending on their his ory of 
positioning, different actors have a protention toward different courses of acti n” (Cardinale, 2018, p. 
142). For example, occupying the position of founder-CEO in a family business is likely to facilitate a 
disposition toward the retrieval of past solutions rather than alternatives involving knowledge from distant 
domains, which is consistent with the view that organizations with a founding CEO present lower 
information exchange and integration (Buyl et al., 2011). Information is retained in individual and 
organizational memory based on the founder-CEO’s direct experience. The vividness of the information 
associated with personal experience may draw a founder-CEO away from external knowledge. This effect 
is reinforced by the CEO’s identity as founder. As Stryker (2008) stated, “When one’s relationships 
depend on being a particular kind of person and playing out particular roles, one is committed to being 
that kind of person” (p. 20). The pre-reflective component of search will thus reflect the internalization of 
those social expectations attached to the position of the actor as founder, and will result in the use of 
distinctive knowledge consistent with its enactment (Benet-Martínez et al., 2006; Cardinale, 2018). 
Illustrating this case in an informal conversation with one of the authors, Maria Niederstaett —the owner 
and founder CEO of Niederstaetter, a South Tyrolean family firm established in 1975 and operating in the 
wholesale distribution of construction and mining cranes and excavating machinery and equipment—
reported the following:  
“Of course, I cannot forget that I am the founding leader of this family firm, which led me to 




that we found in the past puts me in a privileged position to preserve knowledge about past solutions 
and identify internally solutions to current problems.” 
 
When the CEO is a descendent of the founding family, pre-reflective dispositions toward particular 
alternatives will emerge, with both direct and indirect experiences from observation, storytelling, and 
material artifacts serving as touchstones for remembrance (Ocasio et al., 2016). Hence, it is likely that the 
dispositions of later-generation CEOs will reflect the richness of the socio-materials accumulated to 
commemorate family deeds throughout generations. At the same time, the fact that later-generation CEOs 
played the role of “observers” before taking over a controlling position in the firm is likely to make them 
more dispositionally attuned to external information than founder CEOs. For example, during a meeting 
with the second and third authors, Massimo Mercati, the second generation leader of Aboca, an Italian 
family-owned pharmaceutical firm, emphasized that: 
 
“Blending past knowledge coming from our family firm’s tradition with external technological 
knowledge spread across disparate industries and domains is typical of my approach to problem-
solving.” 
 
Finally, by virtue of their prior professional expertise, non-family CEOs may exhibit particular 
dispositions toward courses of action that reflect their own training and knowledge of a domain rather t an 
the family firm’s past experience. In particular, professional CEOs are likely to exhibit a greater propensity 
to make holistic associations, with a pre-reflective orientation toward alternatives that involve domain-
specific knowledge that may reside outside the boundaries of the family firm. This is clearly visible, for 
example, in the case of Airaldo Piva—CEO of Hengdian Group Europe, a family firm established in M lan 
in 2007, now owned by the Chinese Wenrong family and belonging to the family-controlled Hengdian 
Group conglomerate, focusing on electronics, pharmaceutical and chemical, film and entertainment, and 
retail trade activities—when he noted:  
“The outside experience I had in different industries before I took a leading role in Hengdian Group 
Europe has oftentimes played a key role in finding solutions to problems with new approaches that 





The reflective element of search in family firms 
Family idiosyncrasies and histories fossilize into an organized and socially-shared set of family-
centered goals, values, and beliefs, which influence how decision makers regulate their search behaviors 
(Nason et al., 2018; Patel and Fiet, 2011). At the firm level, family ownership is associated with a broad 
spectrum of goals—both financial and nonfinancial—that reflect the desire of family owners to preserve the 
stock of affect-related value the family has invested in the firm, i.e., the family’s socioemotional wealth 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Kotlar and De Massis, 2013; Kotlar et al., 2018). As a result, family firms often 
require more cognitive efforts than non-family firms, since they involve a wider range of actors and interests 
that create more cues to capture and integrate (De Massis et al., 2018a; Strike and Rerup, 2016). 
Much of the work reported in the family business literature suggests that when t re is a strong 
concentration of control, power, and authority in the hands of family members, family ownership and 
leadership tend to prioritizing family-centered non-economic goals over financial goals (Chrisman et al., 
2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). By applying this logic to predict family leaders’ earch behavior in 
response to performance feedback, scholars have suggested that when performance exceeds aspirations, 
senior family leaders are less motivated than their non-family counterparts to allocate capital to search 
activities, as they are more concerned with limiting the risk of socioemotional wealth losses than with 
enhancing satisfactory performance (Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Patel and Chrisman, 2014). By contrast, 
when faced with negative performance feedback, family senior leaders are more willing than their non-
family counterparts to increase their search efforts due to the intertwined nature of economic and affectiv  
considerations elicited by poor performance (Chrisman and Patel, 2012); as performance declines, the risk 
of firm failure increases and, along with it, the treat of losing all the socioemotional wealth associated with 
the family’s control of the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2017). This, in turn, results in increased efforts aimed 





However, the senior leaders’ positional history in the family business social context may cause 
heterogeneity in the ways and extent to which resources are allocated to search activities. Despite the sense 
of community and shared identity that the family is likely to create through socio-material representations 
and affective relationships between and across family and non-family members in the firm, it is likely that 
kinship will temper CEO’s self-interest, fostering commitment to the family’s noneconomic preferences 
(Schulze et al., 2003). As a consequence, the effects of family ownership on search direction and intensity 
will be stronger under the leadership of a family CEO than a professional executive, who will likely have to 
compromise between self-interest, the family’s non-economic agenda, and the firm’s financial goals (e.g., 
Chrisman and Patel, 2012). 
Furthermore, goals and priorities of lone-founder firms are likely to differ from those of extended-
family firms (e.g., Cannella et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2011). In the former, CEOs are likely to be more 
concerned with maintaining their independence and discret on, and as such, may focus on their individuality 
and have li ttle tolerance for family issues, often acting in isolation from the family (Strike and Rerup, 2016). 
By contrast, in the latter, decision-making is typically inclusive of family members’ interests, reflecting their 
collective focus on harmony, conflict avoidance, and interdependence to maximize the family’s 
socioemotional wealth (Chrisman et al., 2005). 
Taken together, these arguments suggest that, by virtue of its agentic nature, the search process is likely 
to follow paths and produce outcomes that differ not only between family and non-family firms, but also 
across family firms with different control configurations (i.e., non-family, founder, and later-generation 
CEO). In the following section, we develop a mathematical model to illustrate how different CEOs search 
for solutions in response to performance feedback, nd examine the systematic differences in performance 
outcomes elicited by a set of search approaches across different firm-control configurations. Although 
theorizing about dynamic processes by means of mathematical models inevitably reduces the richness of the 
theory, it creates a virtual laboratory that allows “capturing reality in flight” and explicitly account for 




Harrison et al., 2007), as well as detecting the subtle or non-intuitive impl cations of micro-level 
mechanisms (Anderson and Lewis, 2013).  
 
A formal model of search in family and non-family firms 
Fig. 1 depicts the search process over repeated feedback loops. Triggered by a problem, search is 
initiated in either a single or multiple strategic domain(s) or department(s). The simplest case involves 
decision makers structuring search in an integrated manner or allocating resources to a single busines unit 
(Levinthal and Posen, 2007). On the other hand, alloc ting resources across different strategic domains 
involves multiple functional units or departments searching in parallel for solutions targeting their specific 
operations or product/market activities (Gaba and Joseph 2013; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003). One of the 
main advantages of structuring search in parallel is the potential for relatively autonomous search to be 
carried out within the designated units or departmen s, and thus for the more rapid identification of a greater 
number of alternatives and a viable solution (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; Levinthal and Posen, 2007). 
Moreover, a parallel search structure across loosely coupled domains may enable exploration and 
exploitation to co-occur, i.e., exploration or exploitation in one domain may coexist with exploitation r 
exploration in another, thereby making ambidexterity feasible (Gupta et al., 2006; Lavie et al., 2010). In 
loosely coupled systems, any previously found and applied solutions can be retained in the domain memory 
and retrieved as needed (Weick, 1976). At the same ti , due to the potential lack of coordination in 
information exchange between the CEO and the functio al units, performing search across loosely coupled 
domains may lead to the premature selection of suboptimal solutions (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003), and 
significant attention and resource costs when the two systems cannot easily identify viable alternatives. 
As decision makers pursue solutions, the feedback from selected courses of action generates 
information cues, thus driving search and decision-making. Here, feedback is broadly conceived as the 
information that comes from implementing a selected alternative with the intent of evaluating and 
improving it (Cyert and March, 1963; Harrison and Rouse, 2015). Hence, decision makers evaluate 




continuing or stopping search in a given department. Since they are boundedly rational and inherently 
satisficing, decision makers continue search in the current strategic domain(s) as long as they are abl to 
obtain acceptable outcomes. In so doing, they construct relatively precise beliefs about what works and why 
(Levitt and March, 1988), in turn yielding results that remain available for retrieval from memory. 
Search in a strategic domain ends either when decision makers receive unacceptable feedback from a 
solution or when they face the risk that the pool of resources available for search will not be sufficient to 
identify and implement a new course of action. When s arch fails in a given domain, the accumulated 
capital that senior leaders have allocated to search is stored as a sunk cost. 
If no other strategic domain is being explored, unacceptable performance feedback induces managers 
to discard any existing strategies and move to strategic domains deemed more appropriate to the present 
situation (Levinthal and March, 1981). Decision makers use memory to identify a past solution from which 
to re-initiate search (otherwise, search simply continues in the other strategic domain). For decision makers 
in non-family firms, we assume this corresponds to the solution yielding the highest performance across the 
latest three trials in the most recently explored strategic domain. However, as family firm decision makers 
are likely to have richer memories and access to temporally distant knowledge, we further assume they are 
able to initiate search from the alternative that yielded the highest performance in the most recently explored 
strategic domain, regardless of its temporal distance. Generally, search ends when a solution that exceeds a 
target performance or aspiration level is found. If two satisfactory courses of action are simultaneously 
identified across two domains or departments, the CEO evaluates them and selects the one that best serves 
the firm (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003). 
(Insert Fig. 1 about here) 
Search attributes and approaches 
As our model is intended to reflect current understanding of the search process, we build on the search 
literature and available empirical findings as an ideal foundation for its formulation and output evaluation 




represent the main variables in our model and to which we refer as search scale, search density, search 
distance, search effort, and search structure. 
Search scale. Search scale refers to the amount of change in an organizatio ’s knowledge base induced 
by search, including creating or absorbing new knowledge, refining and recombining existing knowledge, or 
reducing an organization’s stock of knowledge (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Levinthal and March, 
1981; Nelson and Winter, 1978). Minor variations in existing products, incremental innovations that do not 
require new technologies (Greve, 2007), new marketing campaigns, and cost cutting activities (Bromiley 
and Washburn, 2011; Lant and Montgomery, 1987) are examples of solutions arising from low-scale search. 
On the other hand, high-scale search can be associated with alternatives such as designing and 
manufacturing new products that involve new skills (Greve, 2007; Martin and Mitchell, 1998), or 
developing non-local organizational partnerships (Baum et al., 2005; Iyer and Miller, 2008). 
Search density. Decision makers typically generate and maintain multiple options over the search 
process (Eisenhardt, 1989). Search density describe the number of potential alternatives that decision 
makers are able to envision at a certain point in time, and from among which they select a solution. In this 
sense, search density has an agentic nature, since it depends on the decision makers’ cognitive frameworks 
and inherent limitations that affect their awareness of alternative solutions (Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007). 
We assume that decision makers are able to reduce environmental complexity by creating more or less 
dense solution spaces that reflect their motivation and efforts to search for new information and knowledge 
from both the internal and the external environment (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). 
Search distance. Search distance (local vs. distant) describes how far decision makers figuratively go 
in their search for new information and knowledge (Li et al., 2013). Specifically, it differentiates betw en 
the types of knowledge that decision makers use to identify and implement a viable solution: while local 
search relies on the organization’s existing knowledge base, distant search relies on the absorption of 
knowledge from external sources beyond the organization’s boundaries (e.g., Flor et al., 2018; Li et al., 
2013; Martin and Mitchell, 1998; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). A key insight of these studies is that distant 




lessons learned from the past, and managerial entrenchment (Levitt and March, 1988; Martin and Mitchell, 
1998; Sørensen and Stuart, 2000). Accordingly, local se rch may be preferred because it may produce mor
reliable performance and avoid the costs of knowledge integration (Denrell and March 2001; Laursen, 
2012). However, distant search can embody the variety equired to solve novel problems and generate 
innovative radical solutions, thus affecting search s ale to a greater extent than local search (Fleming and 
Sorenson, 2004; Katila, 2002; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). Akin to search density, the agentic element 
manifests in both its reflective and pre-reflective forms in search distance. For instance, in responding to 
performance problems, decision makers in organizations that have developed routines to access solutions 
from disparate industries and store this knowledge in their organizational memory may use analogies 
between current problems and past courses of action to generate a range of possible alternatives (Hargadon 
and Sutton, 1997). Reflexivity lies in the fact that the retrieval of knowledge from distant domains is 
perceived as a means to solve a current problem. The pre-reflective element consists in the application of 
schemes leading to any similarities between old solutions from distant domains and current problems 
becoming self-evident (Gavetti et al., 2005). 
Search effort. Search effort, defined as the amount of resources that senior leaders allocate to search 
activities, predominantly relates to the reflective dimension of agency. A central notion of performance 
feedback theory is that negative performance feedback acts as a hook that captures decision makers’ 
attention, increasing both their motivation to search for viable solutions and their efforts in search endeavors 
(e.g., Chen and Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003a; Vissa et l., 2010). Indeed, irrespective of the particular search 
locus, decision makers involved in search activities will fee empowered to search more boldly and actively, 
and thus consider a higher number of alternatives (Li et al., 2013). 
Search structure. As mentioned, search structure reflects the ways in which senior leaders structure 
their efforts via choices pertaining to the allocation of resources across their organizations’ functional units 
or departments (Arrfelt et al., 2013; Levinthal and Posen, 2007).  
To graphically represent search attributes, we build on metric space theory (Kelley, 1955) whereby 




elements in a space, such as points, vectors, or more complicated objects. To enable organizations to 
simultaneously search for solutions across functional subunits, we propose that strategic domains of action 
form non-empty subsets in the Euclidean space defined by search effort (E) and scale (K), as illustrated in 
Fig. 2.  
(Insert Fig. 2 about here) 
 
In Fig. 2, i and j represent two different domains or functional units (e.g., (i) manufacturing and 
inventory management, (j) product research and development). Each strategic domain forms a subset of 
solutions in the Euclidean space, which can be thoug t of as a circle: the number of alternatives (grey 
points) that a decision maker can envision in the subset at a given point in time represents search density. Si1 
and Sj1 are the solutions implemented at time 1 in domains i and j, respectively. We assume that a decision 
maker can potentially “move” a small positive distance away from any alternative in a subset without 
moving outside the subset itself, and thus without discarding a selected strategy. The variation of search 
scale from trial 1 to trial 2 (Kj2 - Kj1) represents the amount of knowledge change elicited in an 
organization’s knowledge base by local and distant search. 
Furthermore search scale, effort, and structure univocally identify five different search approaches, a  
graphically represented in Fig. 3. 
(Insert Fig. 3 about here) 
 
Senior leaders embracing arrow exploitation tend to save on search costs by allocating resources to a 
single department specialized in knowledge refinement and efficiency, or performing search in an integrated 
fashion steadily close to the organization’s current state (Nonaka, 1994). Senior leaders espousing narrow 
exploration allocate resources to a single domain or domains in wh ch search proceeds sequentially, but at a 
considerable distance from the organization’s current state. Hence, senior leaders concentrate their search 
efforts in a single strategic domain to create organizationally pervasive responses to problems involving 
experimentation and the creation of new knowledge. Unlike in narrow exploitation, in broad exploitation 
search is decentralized and performed simultaneously across multiple strategic domains, with each 




parallel search structure is thought to help the organization capitalize on the diversity of information, and 
recognize a higher number of potentially viable altrnatives to refine its existing knowledge (March, 199 ). 
Senior leaders adopting an ambidextrous search approach (ambidexterity) allocate resources to loosely 
decoupled domains or functional units, each of which embraces either narrow exploitation or narrow 
exploration. The unit that specializes in exploitation focuses on maximizing efficiency and control. By 
contrast, the unit that specializes in exploration f cuses on experimentation, often creating larger wins or 
losses (Benner and Tushman, 2003). Finally, senior leaders espousing broad exploration focus on creativity 
and experimentation; they are often intrinsically motivated to search for innovative solutions (Amabile, 
1996), and are thus particularly likely to engage in effort ul search by allocating resources to loosely 
coupled functional units that specialize in explorati n. 
Model specifications 
To define the functions and set the parameters in our model, we build on the studies of Levinthal and 
March (1981) and Chrisman and Patel (2012), respectively. In specifying each function, we aim to represent 
both the ostensive and agentic forces leading to the ongoing identification and adjustment of search enacted 
in response to performance feedback across different fi m-control configurations in family and non-family 
firms, and across different search approaches. Table 2 r ports the parameters we use to represent the 
different search approaches in the Euclidean search space.  
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 �� and � represent the “typical” search scale and effort at the beginning of the search process in a 
particular domain I, and define both the center of this domain nd the course of action evaluated by decision 
makers at time zero: � �, �� ; �� represents the radius of domain i. At a given point in time t, we specify 
the search scale in domain i as follows: ��� = ���− + ��  
where ���−  is the search scale—or change in knowledge base—in domain i at time t-1, is a factor 




is the increase or decrease in search scale induced by current performance feedback ��� in domain i. 
Similarly, the formula for search effort in domain i at time t is: 
�� = +  ��− +  ��  
where ��−  is the search effort at time t-1,  is a parameter reflecting momentum in capital allocation 
decisions (e.g., Greve, 2003a; Baum et al., 2000), and �� is the increase or decrease in search effort 
induced by current performance feedback ��� in domain i. 
Search in domain i is stopped at time t if (�� − √ ���− − �� + ��− − � ) < , which 
corresponds to the situation in which the decision makers in department i feel they do not possess, and 
cannot obtain, the resources necessary to continue search, or if  ��� ≤ − , meaning that current feedback 
is unacceptable.  
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that at each t, decision makers set aspiration levels equal to prior
period performance (Cyert and March, 1963; Greve, 2003b). Hence, let ��� = ���− −  ���−  
 
where FBit represents the performance feedback the decision makers in department i receive at the beginning 
of time t from solution �� �� , ��� , while ���−  and ���−  represent the level of performance in domain i at 
time t-1 and t-2, respectively. Building on Levinthal and March’s (1981) model of adaptive search, 
performance in a given domain i at time t, ��� is defined as the difference between the increase/decrease in 
search scale  ��—multiplied by an exogenous environmental variable � randomly varying between -0.5 
and 0.5—and the increase/decrease in search effort  ��  as follows: ��� = + �  �� −  �� 
Based on prior theory and research on search in response to performance feedback (e.g., Arrfelt et al., 
2013; Chen, 2008; Greve, 2003a), decision makers, by virtue of means-end considerations, are assumed to 
increase search effort and resource allocation to a given strategic domain i at a constant rate with the 
distance of performance below aspiration level, i.e., when the absolute value of ��� ≤  increases. Hence: 




As Table 3 shows, we assume � = .  and that � varies across different controlling configurations in 
family firms. Specifically, since socioemotional wealth preferences and family-centered priorities are 
expected to be weaker among founding-family-controlled firms with founder CEOs than among 
extended-family-controlled firms with later-generation CEOs, and to be even weaker among 
professionally managed family-owned firms, we set |�| equal to 0.05 for family-owned firms with non-
family CEOs, 0.10 for founding-family-controlled firms with founder CEOs, and 0.15 for extended-
family-controlled firms with later-generation CEOs. This range of values is in line with the findings of 
Chrisman and Patel (2012). 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
The increase/decrease in search scale at time t in a given domain is assumed to depend on the change in 
the firm’s knowledge base elicited by the decision makers’ p e-reflective disposition toward information 
from within and beyond the organizational boundaries. Building on the studies conducted by Baum and 
Dahlin (2007) and Posen and Chen (2013) showing that decision makers’ propensity to use external 
knowledge increases with performance distance below aspirations, we specify the decision makers’ focus on 
local vs. distant knowledge as a linear function of performance feedback, as follows: 
�� = − ���  ��� − ���  ��� 
  
where ��� represents the change in domain i’s knowledge base (or search scale) elicited by the 
reinterpretation and recombination of existing knowledge, and ��� denotes the amount of knowledge 
generated by distant search in domain i at time t. Decision makers are assumed to search locally and 
distantly by sampling a number of alternatives—representing search density—and by selecting a course 
of action from among such alternatives. However, unlike Levinthal and March (1981), we assume that 
decision makers are unable to evaluate alternatives off-line, and that a selected alternative needs to be 
implemented to assess its performance implications. As a result, superior trials are no more likely to be 




The effect on search scale and the number of alternatives that decision makers are able to envision are 
assumed to differ for the two types of search (Levinthal and March, 1981). For both local and distant search, 
it is assumed that search scale increase/decrease follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and a standard 
deviation proportional to the value of the search scale associated with the current solution. 
Specifically, ���~� , � ���− ) and ���~� , � ���− ), with � > � . The density of local and distant 
searches, corresponding to the sample size for  ���  and ���, is defined as a function of search effort, 
search proficiency, and decision makers’ propensity toward alternatives that make use of either internal or 
boundary-spanning knowledge. Thus, if � �� is search proficiency in domain  at time t, the sample sizes 
for  ���  and ��� are given by the integer values:  ���� =  ��− � ��   ���� =  ��− � ��  
In line with previous studies, we assume that search proficiency increases with the number of trials, 
albeit at a decreasing rate (Argote 1999; Levinthal and March, 1981). As described earlier, the decision 
makers’ pre-reflective disposition toward alternatives involving internal vs. external knowledge,  and 
, will depend on who owns and manages the firm, as shown in Table 3. In particular, the cognitive 
frameworks of decision makers in family firms will lead them to focus more on reinte preting and using 
knowledge anchored in the family tradition than on external knowledge, thereby sampling more 
alternatives from local search and fewer from distant search compared to their non-family counterparts. 
Furthermore, compared to family fi rms owned and led by founder CEOs, firms owned and managed by 
extended families involving multiple generations are likely to possess richer sociomaterial 
representations, which play an important role in contributing to the creation nd sustenance of identity 
and activity across generations, while also providing a broader set of components for recombination (De 
Massis et al., 2016). Finally, the presence of multiple voices from different family members belonging to 
different generations enriches the cognitive framework of the collective family business with elements 




Massis, 2013; Nason et al., 2018), thereby providing decision makers with distant information on which 
to rely to identify viable alternatives. 
 
Simulations and computational experiments 
We constructed our simulation model using MATLAB. The model generats a time series of decisions 
and outcomes that depend on both a number of initial conditions and parameters1 and stochastic variation. 
For each firm-control configuration, we evaluated the simulated search process by tracking the average level 
and cross-sectional variation (standard deviation) f performance of all firms across the five search 
approaches in each time period t and at the end of the search process. All the results presented in this section 
are based upon 100 runs of each search approach for each firm-control configuration, resulting in 2,000 
organizations in the simulation2. 
Static environment. We first simulated the model in an unchanging environment, fixing the 
environmental variable at zero, and speculating that some interesting features would emerge from 
considering the socio-cognitive characteristics of the senior leaders involved in the search activity. To assess 
the significance of the differences in performance av rage and variance at the end of the search process, 
contingent on search success, we conducted Leven’s t st for equality of variances to check for the 
homogeneity of performance variance across the samples of different firm-control configurations (Table 4). 
As expected, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated; hence, we conducted Satterthwaite’s 
modified t-tests of mean performance across each search approach within each firm-control configuration at 
success. Table 5 presents the results of these test. 
(Insert Tables 4, 5, and 6 about here) 
 
 
First, we found narrow exploitation to be significantly less effective than the alternative search 
approaches across all the firm-control configurations. Narrow exploration appeared to be inferior to broad 
                                                          
1
 Default values for the model are = .99, = . , � = . 5, � = . 5 , = . 5, � = − .5. Unless otherwise 
noted, these values are used in all the results reported here. Supplementary material reporting the simulation model script can be 
obtained from the first author.  
2




exploration and ambidexterity among non-family firms, family firms with non-family CEOs, and family 
firms with founder CEOs, whereas no statistically significant differences emerged from the comparison 
between narrow exploration and the other search appro ches (except for narrow exploitation) in family 
firms with later-generation CEOs. Furthermore, narrow exploration was significantly more effective than 
broad exploitation across professionally managed family firms (difference = 0.25, p<.05). In this particular 
firm-control configuration, broad exploration was significantly more effective than all the other sarch 
approaches examined. Broad exploration was also conducive to high performance in non-family firms, 
although no statistically significant difference emerged when comparing mean performance between broad 
exploration and ambidexterity. Conversely, family firms with founder CEOs seemd to benefit from 
ambidexterity. Finally, the results appeard to be less conclusive across family firms with later-generation 
CEOs, providing only marginal support for the superiority of broad exploration over the other search 
approaches. 
Additionally, we compared mean search performance across the various firm-control configurations to 
detect the superiority of a particular actor in performing the search activity in general, or adopting a iven 
search approach in particular. A marginally significant difference in overall perfo mance was detected 
between CEOs in non-family firms and founder CEOs in family firms; the former exhibiting higher 
performance than the latter (difference = 0.10, p<.10). The overall search performance of founder-led family 
firms was significantly inferior to both the mean search performance of family firms led by non-family 
CEOs (difference = -0.13, p<.05) and the mean performance of family firms led by later-generation CEOs 
(difference = -0.10, p<.05). Overall, these results indicate that, in stable environments, founder CEOs are 
less performative in their search activities compared to other senior leaders. 
Table 6 presents the results of Satterthwaite’s modified t-tests of mean performance across each firm-
control configuration for each search approach. These r ults shed further light on the drivers of inferior 
search performance in founder-led family firms. Compared to their counterparts, founder CEOs appeard to 
be less attuned to, and capable of, performing explorative search. Specifically, narrow exploration was 




non-family CEOs (difference = 0.35, p<.01), and in family firms led by later-generation CEOs (difference 
(reversed) = 0.34, p<.05). Similar results were observed for broad exploration, with both non-family firm 
CEOs (difference = 0.27, p<.05) and non-family CEOs in family firms (difference = 0.38, p<.05) showing 
greater search performance than founder CEOs. By contrast, the latter seem to have the cognitive 
frameworks that may potentially enable them to achieve superior search performance by embracing 
ambidexterity. As shown in Table 6, ambidextrous search performance i  founder-led family firms was 
never inferior to the performances of other firm-contr l configurations embracing ambidexterity, and was 
superior to the performance achieved by family firms with later-generation CEOs (difference=0.19, p<.10). 
These findings, combined with the results presented in Table 5, highlight the important role that 
ambidexterity plays in founder-led family firms operating in stable environments: not only is ambidexterity 
a superior search approach, but founder CEOs seem to have the “ingredients” to excel in performing 
ambidextrous search. For example, the founder CEO of Niederstaetter, who we mentioned earlier, pointed 
out that her family firm substantially benefited from the simultaneous adoption of radical solutions in a 
specific strategic domain, such as special transportation solutions for construction cranes, and incremental 
solutions in other domains, such as training and consulti g in the use of excavating machinery, strongly 
relying, in both cases, on the family’s tradition and past knowledge accumulated. 
In addition to benefiting from broad exploration (Table 5), professionally managed family firms seem 
to be particularly attuned to performing explorative search, always exhibiting either superior or non-i ferior 
performance in both narrow and broad exploration compared to other firm-control configurations (Table 6). 
For example, Ailraldo Piva, the non-family CEO of the family-owned firm Hengdian Group Europe, 
emphasized in a recent workshop how the transition from a founder-led to a professional-led family firm 
typically leads to the implementation of radical souti ns to management problems, and this becomes 
particularly beneficial for professionally managed family firms. Moreover, he stressed that the industry 
knowledge and experience accumulated in his career outside the family firm was crucial to his ability to 




Finally, although family firms led by later-generation CEOs tend to benefit more from broad 
exploration than other search approaches (Table 5), later-generation CEOs are not equipped with cognitive 
frameworks and dispositions that enable them to outperform their counterparts when embracing broad 
exploration. Rather, they seem to excel in broad exploitation (Table 6). 
Dynamic environment. We then tested whether our results generalize to systematic exogenous change 
by randomly drawing the environmental variable from a given range (-0.50; 0.50) in each iteration (March 
1991). Tables 7 and 8 show that performance linked to different search approaches is sensitive to the rate of 
change in the environment in family-owned firms. In particular, while in non-family firms broad exploration 
and ambidexterity seem to be conducive to superior performance, with no significant difference found 
between the two, broad exploration is found significantly more effective than the alternative search 
approaches across all the different firm-control configurations involving family ownership. 
(Insert Tables 7, 8, and 9 about here) 
 
No statistically significant differences in overall search performance em rged across the four 
different firm-control configurations. Similarly, we did not find any statistically significant differences in 
search performance across the five different search approaches when comparing family firms led by non-
family CEOs, founder CEOs, and later-generation CEOs. 
However, as Table 9 shows, significant differences emerged when comparing family and non-family 
firms. In particular, in dynamic environments, non-family firms were superior in narrow exploitation 
compared to both founder-led (difference = 0.47, p<.05) and later generation-led (diff rence = 0.46, 
p<.05) family firms. This finding highlights the importance of relying on external knowledge sources 
when performing exploitative search in dynamic environments (Foss et al., 2013). By contrast, on-
family firms appeared to be less performative than their family counterparts in conducting broad 
exploration (difference vs. professionalized family firms = -0.67, p<.05; difference vs. founder-led family 
firms=-0.70, p<.10; difference vs. later generation-led family firms = -0.60, p<.10). Combined with those 




benefit more from embracing broad exploration, ambidexterity may be a more viable approach for non-
family firms.  
 
Discussion 
This study has sought to advance the search and family business literatures by exploring how and to 
what extent different search approaches—involving either specialization or ambidexterity—may lead to 
heterogeneous performance outcomes across family and no -family firms with different firm-control 
configurations. By taking a first step toward accounting for the agentic nature of search as both reflective 
and pre-reflective, our model responds to Posen et al.’s (2018) recent call for a theory of search that 
incorporates a more cognitively rich role of participants in the search process, and the quest to establish the 
microfoundations of ambidexterity (Felin et al., 2015; Rogan and Mors, 2014). 
While there is generally unanimous support in the search literature for the contention that ambidexterity 
is a superior search approach (e.g., He and Wong, 2004; March, 1991), in this study, we developed a 
microfoundational perspective that challenges this prevailing view. First, we identified a limited focus in the 
search literature on the organizational level and the overall depiction of search as a highly mechanistic, 
nearly automatic activity (Li et al., 2013). Prior studies rarely take into account the active involvement of 
organizational actors in the operating procedures regulating the search process—i.e., their agency—and the 
actors’ embeddedness in the social context in which they operate (Miron-Spektor et al., 2017; Rogan and 
Mors, 2014). However, agency is apparent in every choice senior leaders made in relation to resource 
allocation and to the courses of action around which to orient the search activity. Hence, taking into account 
microfoundational aspects—the individual behaviors and cognitive mechanisms that underlie the way in 
which search is performed—is the first step toward predicting and explaining the outcomes of search and 
ambidexterity. 
Second, we developed a mathematical model and compared different search appro ches across family 
and non-family firms led by different senior leaders to understand how decision makers’ cognitive 




render some particular search approaches more effective than others. Taken together, our simulation results 
confirm our original contention: search is idiosyncratic across firms and their senior leaders. While 
balancing exploitation and exploration is a superior search approach for family firms with founder CEOs 
(e.g., Chrisman and Patel, 2012), family firms led by non-family CEOs seem to benefit from specialization, 
and especially from broad exploration. Moreover, when operating in dynamic environments, unlike non-
family firms, which appear to benefit from ambidexterity, family firms seem to achieve superior 
performance through high-variance search approaches based on broad exploration. I  particular, the richness 
and extended temporal span of families’ collective memories and socio-material representatio s translate 
into their senior leaders’ idiosyncratic ability to cope with performance variability and restore acceptable 
performance by retrieving past solutions to fit the pr sent situation.  
 
Implications for theory  
The microfoundational approach proposed in this article has important theoretical implications for the 
search, ambidexterity, and family business literatures. Our study highlights the importance of agency i  
explaining search in response to performance feedback and managing the ambidexterity paradox (e.g., 
Andriopolous and Lewis, 2010; Smith and Lewis, 2011). Specifically, we theorize the role of the social 
context in which senior leaders operate (i.e., family vs. non-family firms) and their position (i.e., 
professional, founder, or later-generation CEO) in influencing search attributes both reflectively and pre-
reflectively. While we relate the reflective element to the ways in which senior leaders regulate their 
resource allocation decisions in a means-end fashion, we link the pre-reflective dimension to the senior 
leaders’ propensities toward some knowledge sources above others. By integrating these micro-level 
mechanisms, we provide novel insights into the ambidexterity dilemma at the micro-level (Abell t al., 
2008; Eisenhardt et al., 2010; Felin et al., 2012, 2015; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013). Our simulation results 
indicate that if senior leaders are either willing or pre-reflectively oriented toward simultaneously 
undertaking high-scale search across multiple domains, both professional-led and later generation-led family 




performance problems. When such orientation is lacking, family firms may face a new paradox that 
manifests in decision makers’ undertaking inferior search approaches (e.g., narrow exploitation), despite 
their ability to achieve superior returns from broad exploration (Chrisman et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, by modelling the search behaviors and related cognitive mechanisms of senior leaders in 
both family and non-family firms, our study extends the scope of traditional approaches to the study of 
search and the tensions arising from the simultaneous pursuit of exploitation and exploration (Raisch and 
Birkinshaw, 2008; Raisch et al., 2009; Smith and Lewis, 2011). Specifying the search process in its enirety 
in a mathematical form is a contribution in and of itself. In particular, our fine-grained and comprehensive 
characterization of the search process as an integrated set of attributes goes beyond prior thinking o 
feedback-induced organizational change (e.g., Chen, 2008; Greve 2003a, 2007; Madsen and Desai, 2010; 
Vissa et al., 2010), proposing a broader view of this process by integrating insights from qualitative, 
process-oriented descriptions of search, and offering a precise conceptual and mathematical representation 
that accounts for the dual nature of search as both ostensive and agentic. Specifically, b identifying search 
outcomes across different search approaches and documenting the mechanisms regulating the behaviors of 
the key decision makers involved in the search process for exploitation and exploration, his study enhances 
our understanding of how and with which performance outcomes socially-embedded senior leaders respond 
to performance feedback in static versus dynamic enviro ments. 
The new microfoundational view developed in this study also enriches the family business literature by 
pointing to the micro-level origins of family firm heterogeneity. Although embeddedness in the family 
social context provides rich socio-material artefacts and goals that enable, constraint, and orient the search 
process, the results of our simulation reveal the importance of also considering the positional history of 
senior leaders in this context. For instance, althoug  founder CEOs and later-generation CEOs may play the 
same role in their current position as CEOs of family firms, they differ in terms of their past roles and 
responsibilities, and this directs their dispositions and propensities toward different paths (cf. Cardin le, 




transmute into a superior ability to perform broad exploitation and narrow exploration in contrast to founder 
CEOs who seem more capable of performing ambidextrous search. 
Finally, our findings indicate that the performance resulting from different search approaches is 
sensitive to the rate of change in the external enviro ment. For instance, while founder-led family firms are 
likely to benefit from ambidexterity in stable environments, environmental dynamism makes broad 
exploration more viable. In this respect, a contextualized analysis is fundamental to understand search and 
organizational responses to feedback, and more generally, to achieve theoretical validity and empirical 
generalizability in the study of the behaviors of organizations and their senior leaders (De Massis et al, 
2018b). 
 
Implications for practice  
This study also has direct managerial implications, suggesting that specialization itself may not be 
detrimental to search performance. Although scholars and practitioners believe that firms must achieve a 
balanced mix of exploitation and exploration, ambidexterity is not always the optimal search approach to 
achieve superior performance. For instance, family firm decision makers operating in dynamic 
environments could improve the performance of their s arch approaches by undertaking broad exploration. 
Thus, our study highlights the importance of motivating and educating family firm decision makers to focus 
on creativity and experimentation by decentralizing ad performing search activities simultaneously across 
multiple strategic domains. Particularly, family firm decision makers should be motivated and trained to 
engage in effortful search by allocating resources to loosely coupled functional units that specialize in 
exploration as opposed to saving on search costs by allocating resources to a single department specialized 
in knowledge refinement and efficiency, or simultaneously searching for solutions close to and far from an 
organization’s current knowledge base. Conversely, founder CEOs in family firms operating in stable 
environments should be trained to act ambidextrously by allocating resources to organizational units that
simultaneously specialize in explorative and exploitative search, serving as a point of integration betwe n 





Limitations and future directions  
As with any theory, our work builds on a series of assumptions that serve as boundary conditions and 
deserve further consideration. First, important to point out is that our simulation results do not prove or 
disprove anything; what they do is reproduce search performance outcomes in a way that is sufficiently 
realistic to provide insights into theory. The inclusion of a few illustrative examples is intended to 
complement our theoretical development by exemplifying the simulation results in more concrete terms. 
Nevertheless, the results may differ depending on the problem faced by decision makers and their prior 
accumulated experience. By unpacking and articulating the components of the search process in a stylized 
way, we have suggested some constructs and relationships that could guide future research. 
Second, in our model, search is triggered by, and focuses on, a single objective related to the focal 
performance problem. Although this assumption is not uncommon in the literature where the terms 
“search”, “problemistic search”, and “problem-solving” are often used interchangeably to indicate a form of 
search that is goal-oriented (Greve, 2003b, p. 55; Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Sheremata, 2000), search can 
occur independently of specific problem triggers (Posen et al., 2018). For instance, slack or institutionalized 
search—two alternative types of search processes proposed in the behavioral theory of the firm—can start or 
continue upon reaching satisfactory performance feedback. While slack search stems from any extra time 
and resources that can be used for experimentation without being deliberately managed (Cyert and March, 
1963; Greve, 2003b), institutionalized search is conducted within periodical planning and budgeting cycles 
(Greve, 2003b). As slack and institutionalized search processes are not goal-oriented, it is likely that the pre-
reflective dimension of agency—rather than means-end considerations—will play a central role in 
determining the outcomes of these alternative search types. Inv tigating the mechanisms through which the 
pre-reflective element of agency shapes these search pro esses is an important theoretical and empirical 
question for future research. 
Third, there is a need for research to integrate the attention-based view with the ambidexterity literature 




these firms manage the organizational tensions associ ted with exploitation and exploration. For instance, 
we have assumed that, by recalling and commemorating past events through family stories and narratives, 
later-generation CEOs or successors have access to the family memory accumulated by their predecessors 
across generations. Nevertheless, family business succe sors are not always inclined to use such family 
memory (e.g., Miller et al., 2003), and their inclinat on may depend on how they perceive the behavior of 
their parents (Garcia et al., 2018). Thus, future research could investigate whether there is any difference 
between conservative succession—where successors take a more conservative approach and emphasize 
continuity with the previous leader— and non-conservative succession—where successors follow policies 
that are diametrically opposed to those of their predecessors (e.g., Miller et al., 2003). The literature on 
family business succession emphasizes the importance of intra-family succession as a potentially disruptive 
period in the lifecycle of a family firm (e.g., Gersick et al., 1997; Kotlar and De Massis, 2013), potentially 
unsettling the mechanisms regulating the behaviors of the decision makers involved in the search process, 
and we welcome future studies on this topic. More generally, we advocate the need to understand how 
succession from the founder to later-generation CEOs influences the development of ambidexterity in 
family firms, and how search approaches may change during the succession process. 
Fourth, in our model, the agentic element of search is associated with the actor who “designs” and 
“influences” the search process—namely, the CEO—rather than those who execute it. Specifically, an 
assumption underlying our model is that the CEO’s personal beliefs, goals, and dispositions wield a strong 
influence over the formation and alteration of collective interpretations. We assume that it is the CEO who 
orients the search process around potentially viable trials or courses of action to initiate an experiential and 
more refined search process. However, other actors could also exert a strong influence on collective 
interpretation, and thus affect the dispositions of CEOs and search participants toward particular couses of 
action (Nason et al., 2018). Moreover, the family business literature has recently questioned the assumption 
that once strategy is designed, its execution follows (Chrisman et al., 2016). Future studies could investigate 




influence such dispositions. Theories of coalitions, heed communication, and political behavior may help 
address similar questions (e.g., Lubatkin et al., 2006; Rogan and Mors, 2014). 
Fifth, different firm-control configurations may affect the decision makers’ willingness and/or pre-
reflective dispositions to undertake particular approaches in the Euclidean space, another aspect that 
warrants future investigation. In the context of search, researchers could investigate the contingencies and 
boundary conditions that lead different decision makers across family and non-family firms to adopt a 
specific search approach, and more specifically, influe ce their initial positioning in the Euclidean search 
space. In so doing, future research would offer new insights on how the context shapes the ways in which 
organizations solve problems, and more generally, the ways in which organizational decision makers turn
present perceptions of failure into future choices of action. For example, this is the case of the open 
innovation aptitude of firms, which has been proven to influence how organizations search for knowledge 
and information across their boundaries (e.g., Bresciani, et al., 2017; Chiang and Hung, 2010; Laursen and 
Salter, 2014). In this vein, exploratory studies on open innovation in the family firm setting have indicated 
that specific contingencies associated with family firm idiosyncrasies affect the way they execute open 
innovation strategies (e.g., Casprini et al., 2017; Kotlar et al., 2013). Additionally, integrating dynamic 
managerial capability perspectives (cf. Helfat and Martin, 2015; Teece, 2007), and linking these with the 
different search approaches undertaken by family and non-family firms, would provide further important 
insights into the search behaviors of organizational actors. Another potential direction for future research is 
examining additional dimensions of search, such as knowledge temporality, complexity, and centrality.  
Finally, in our model we assume that problems are always decomposable, and as a number of studies 
have pointed out, this is not always the case (Levinthal and March, 1993). Whether search inputs and 
outputs are characterized by clarity or ambiguity, the search process is highly intertwined with sense-making 
and interpretation processes (Rudolph et al., 2009), presenting both knowledge-transfer and knowledge-
formation hazards (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). Scholars could easily extend our conceptual framework 
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The agentic nature of search in family firms. 
Individual position Pre-reflective element Reflective element 
 The social context of family firms and 
the socio-material representations 
related to family histories predispose 
actors toward some courses of action 
that appear to be endowed with a sense 
of inevitability. 
The intertwined nature of economic and 
affective goals affects the way in which 
family firms regulate their search 
behavior as a means to preserve family 
ocioemotional wealth 
Founder CEO The vividness of information associated 
with direct experience tends to draw 
founder-CEOs toward alternatives that 
involve internal, rather than external, 
knowledge. 
Search behavior reflects the founder’s 
intentional pursuit of independence and 
discretion. 
Later-generation CEO The habitus of “observing” together 
with the richness of the socio-material 
representations accumulated over 
generations render later-generation 
CEOs dispositionally attuned to both 
internal and external knowledge. 
Search behavior reflects the focus on 
harmony and intentional conflict 
avoidance in relation to protecting the 
family’s socioemotional wealth. 
Non-family CEO Complex cognitive frameworks 
reflecting individual training and 
domain-specific knowledge orient non-
family CEOs toward alternatives that 
involve domain-relevant rather than 
family-relevant knowledge. 
Search behavior reflects a balance 
between self-interest, the family’s non-











Example Ei Ki 
Narrow exploitation 1 
Manufacturing and inventory 
management 
4 4 
Narrow exploration 1 
Product research and 
development 
8 8 
Broad exploitation 2 
Manufacturing and inventory 
management 
4 4 
Marketing and advertising 4 4 
Broad exploration 2 
Product research and 
development 
8 8 
Finance 8 8 
Ambidexterity 2 
Manufacturing and inventory 
management 
4 4 















Family firms with 
non-family CEOs 
Family firms with 
founder CEOs 
Family firms with 
later-generation 







Tests for equality of performance variances and means across search approaches at search end. 
Search approach 
Non-family firms 
Family firms with 
non-family CEOs 
Family firms with 
founder CEOs 
Family firms with 
later-generation CEOs 
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Narrow exploitation 0.81 0.70 0.87 0.77 0.82 0.65 0.87 0.76 
Narrow exploration 1.11 1.06 1.20 1.04 0.84 0.97 1.18 1.09 
Broad exploitation 0.97 0.71 0.95 0.73 1.00 0.82 1.10 0.67 
Broad exploration 1.44 0.97 1.55 1.29 1.17 1.11 1.39 1.35 
Ambidexterity 1.30 0.97 1.24 0.83 1.33 1.08 1.14 0.91 
Total 1.13 0.92 1.16 0.98 1.03 0.96 1.14 1.00 
Levene’s test for equality 
of variances F(4, 495) 







Difference in mean performance across search approaches at search end. 
Non-family firms 
 Narrow exploitation Narrow exploration Broad exploitation Broad exploration 
Narrow exploration -0.30 (0.13)*    
Broad exploitation -0.16 (0.10)† 0.13 (0.13)   
Broad exploration -0.63 (0.12)*** -0.33 (0.14)* -0.47 (0.12)***  
Ambidexterity -0.49 (0.12)*** -0.19 (0.14)† -0.33 (0.12)** 0.14 (0.14) 
Family firms with non-family CEOs 
 Narrow exploitation Narrow exploration Broad exploitation Broad exploration 
Narrow exploration -0.33 (0.13)**    
Broad exploitation -0.08 (0.11) 0.25 (0.13)*   
Broad exploration -0.68 (0.15)*** -0.36 (0.17)* -0.60 (0.15)***  
Ambidexterity -0.37 (0.11)*** -0.04 (0.13) -0.29 (0.11)** 0.31 (0.15)* 
Family firms with founder CEOs 
 Narrow exploitation Narrow exploration Broad exploitation Broad exploration 
Narrow exploration -0.02 (0.12)    
Broad exploitation -0.18 (0.10)* -0.16 (0.13)   
Broad exploration -0.36 (0.13)** -0.33 (0.15)* -0.17 (0.14)  
Ambidexterity -0.51 (0.13)*** -0.49 (0.14)*** -0.33 (0.14)** -0.16 (0.15) 
Family firms with later-generation CEOs 
 Narrow exploitation Narrow exploration Broad exploitation Broad exploration 
Narrow exploration -0.31 (0.13)**    
Broad exploitation -0.23 (0.10)* 0.08 (0.13)   
Broad exploration -0.52 (0.15)*** -0.21 (0.17) -0.29 (0.15)*  
Ambidexterity -0.28 (0.12)* 0.04 (0.14) -0.05 (0.11) 0.25 (0.16)† 
Notes: 
†p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p <.001. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. The difference in performance is the average column performance less the average row performance, with a 







Difference in mean performance across firm-control specifications at search end. 
Narrow exploitation    
 Non-family firm Non-family CEO Founder CEO 
Non-family CEO -0.06 (0.10)   
Founder CEO -0.01 (0.10) 0.05 (0.10)  
Later-generation CEO -0.06 (0.10) 0.00 (0.10) -0.05 (0.10) 
Narrow exploration    
 Non-family firm Non-family CEO Founder CEO 
Non-family CEO -0.09 (0.15)   
Founder CEO 0.26 (0.14)* 0.35 (0.14)**  
Later-generation CEO -0.07 (0.15) 0.01 (0.15) -0.34 (0.15)* 
Broad exploitation    
 Non-family firm Non-family CEO Founder CEO 
Non-family CEO 0.03 (0.10)   
Founder CEO -0.03 (0.11) -0.05 (0.11)  
Later-generation CEO -0.12 (0.10) -0.15 (0.10)† -0.10 (0.11) 
Broad exploration    
 Non-family firm Non-family CEO Founder CEO 
Non-family CEO -0.11(0.16)   
Founder CEO 0.27 (0.15)* 0.38 (0.17)*  
Later-generation CEO 0.05 (0.16) 0.16 (0.19) -0.22 (0.18) 
Ambidexterity    
 Non-family firm Non-family CEO Founder CEO 
Non-family CEO 0.06 (0.16)   
Founder CEO -0.03 (0.14) -0.09 (0.13)  
Later-generation CEO 0.16 (0.13) 0.09 (0.12) 0.19 (0.14)† 
Notes: 
†p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p <.001. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. The difference in performance is the average column performance less the average row performance, with a 







Tests for equality of performance variances and means across search approaches at search end under 
dynamic environmental conditions. 
Search approach 
Non-family firms 
Family firms with 
non-family CEOs 
Family firms with 
founder CEOs 
Family firms with 
later-generation CEOs 
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Narrow exploitation 1.65 1.74 1.43 1.70 1.18 1.82 1.18 1.49 
Narrow exploration 1.95 3.49 1.61 2.69 1.68 2.31 1.43 2.53 
Broad exploitation 1.86 1.53 1.72 1.79 1.81 1.83 1.80 1.74 
Broad exploration 2.64 2.65 3.33 2.82 3.34 3.68 3.24 3.27 
Ambidexterity 2.62 2.53 2.22 2.46 2.46 3.01 2.51 3.06 
Total 2.14 2.51 2.06 2.43 2.10 2.72 2.03 2.62 
Levene’s test for equality 
of variances F(4, 495) 







Difference in mean performance across search approaches at search end under dynamic environmental 
conditions. 
Non-family firms 
 Narrow exploitation Narrow exploration Broad exploitation Broad exploration 
Narrow exploration -0.30 (0.39)    
Broad exploitation -0.21 (0.23) 0.09 (0.38)   
Broad exploration -0.99 (0.32)**  -0.70 (0.44)† -0.78 (0.31)*  
Ambidexterity -0.97 (0.31)***  -0.68 (0.43)† -0.76 (0.30)* 0.02 (0.37) 
Family firms with non-family CEOs 
 Narrow exploitation Narrow exploration Broad exploitation Broad exploration 
Narrow exploration -0.18 (0.32)    
Broad exploitation -0.29 (0.25) -0.11 (0.32)   
Broad exploration -1.90 (0.33)***  -1.72 (0.39)***  -1.60 (0.33)***   
Ambidexterity -0.79 (0.30)**  -0.61 (0.36)* -0.50 (0.30)† 1.11 (0.37)**  
Family firms with founder CEOs 
 Narrow exploitation Narrow exploration Broad exploitation Broad exploration 
Narrow exploration -0.50 (0.29)*    




Broad exploration -2.16 (0.41)***  -1.66 (0.43)***  -1.54 (0.41)***   
Ambidexterity -1.28 (0.35)***  -0.78 (0.38)* -0.66 (0.35)* 0.88 (0.48)* 
Family firms with later-generation CEOs 
 Narrow exploitation Narrow exploration Broad exploitation Broad exploration 
Narrow exploration -0.24 (0.29)    
Broad exploitation -0.62 (0.23)**  -0.37 (0.31)   
Broad exploration -2.06 (0.36)***  -1.81 (0.41)***  -1.43 (0.37)***   
Ambidexterity -1.32 (0.34)***  -1.08 (0.40)**  -0.70 (0.35)* 0.73 (0.45)† 
Notes: 
†p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p <.001. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. The difference in performance is the average column performance less the average row performance, with a 







Difference in mean performance across firm-control configurations at search end under dynamic 
environmental conditions. 
Narrow exploitation    
 Non-family firm Non-family CEO Founder CEO 
Non-family CEO 0.21 (0.24)   
Founder CEO 0.47 (0.25)* 0.25 (0.25)  
Later-generation CEO 0.46 (0.23)* 0.25 (0.23) -0.00 (0.23) 
Narrow exploration    
 Non-family firm Non-family CEO Founder CEO 
Non-family CEO 0.33 (0.34)   
Founder CEO 0.26 (0.42) -0.07 (0.35)  
Later-generation CEO 0.52 (0.43) 0.18 (0.40) 0.25 (0.34) 
Broad exploitation    
 Non-family firm Non-family CEO Founder CEO 
Non-family CEO 0.14 (0.23)   
Founder CEO 0.05 (0.24) -0.08 (0.26)  
Later-generation CEO 0.06 (0.23) -0.08 (0.25) 0.00 (0.25) 
Broad exploration    
 Non-family firm Non-family CEO Founder CEO 
Non-family CEO -0.69 (0.39)*   
Founder CEO -0.70 (0.45)† -0.01 (0.46)  
Later-generation CEO -0.60 (0.42)† 0.09 (0.43) 0.10 (0.49) 
Ambidexterity    
 Non-family firm Non-family CEO Founder CEO 
Non-family CEO 0.40 (0.35)   
Founder CEO 0.16 (0.39) -0.24 (0.38)  
Later-generation CEO 0.12 (0.40) -0.28 (0.39) -0.04 (0.43) 
Notes: 
†p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p <.001. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. The difference in performance is the average column performance less the average row performance, with a 

































Fig. 1. Search process: flow diagram. 
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Fig. 2. Search attributes in the Euclidean search space. 
 







































































   
 Low  High 
  Search Effort  
 













Ej1 Ei1 Ej1 
Kj1 
Ki1 
 
Kj1 
Ki1 
 
